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Chapter 1: Globalisation and the Reputation Race  
The current strength of research in European universities has been called into 
question in two recent surveys, which – despite some cultural and 
methodological biases – came to the conclusion that European universities are 
not performing strongly in global comparisons (Europa, 2004, p. 23). 
The world rankings of the 500 universities show the poor state of academic 
institutions in Islamic countries…To ameliorate this situation,…the 
OIC…resolved to strengthen selected universities in the fields of science and 
engineering, with the goal of elevating at least 20 universities within the 
Islamic countries to the rank among the top 500 world universities 
(Organisation of the Islamic Conference, in Bilal, 2007). 
 
[A]Globalisation and Rankings 
There is a growing obsession with university rankings around the world. What started as 
an academic exercise in the early 20th century in the US became a commercial ‘information’ 
service for students in the 1980s and the progenitor of a ‘reputation race’ with geo-political 
implications today. Around the world, rankings consciousness has risen sharply and, arguably 
inevitably, in response to globalisation and the pursuit of new knowledge as the basis of 
economic growth, and the drive for increased public accountability and transparency. 
Rankings are a manifestation of what has become known as the worldwide ‘battle for 
excellence’, and are perceived and used to determine the status of individual institutions, 
assess the quality and performance of the higher education system and gauge global 
competitiveness. As internationalization has become a priority for both government and 
higher education, the talent-catching and knowledge-producing capacity of higher education 
has become a vital sign of a country’s capacity to participate in world science and the global 
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economy. In the process, rankings are transforming universities and reshaping higher 
education. Despite the fact that there are over 15,000 higher education institutions (HEIs) 
worldwide1
Published by, inter alia, government and accreditation agencies, higher education, 
research and commercial organisations, and the popular media, rankings have become 
ubiquitous since the 1990s. The U.S. News and World Report’s special issue on ‘America's 
Best Colleges’ has been published annually in U.S. News magazine and as a separate 
newsstand guidebook since 1987, and remains the most popular in that country. Around the 
world, media organisations have predominated in the publication of such lists, inter alia, the 
Times Higher Education Supplement (first published in The Times, October 1992), the 
Financial Times and The Sunday Times (UK/Ireland), Der Spiegel (Germany), Macleans 
(Canada), Reforma (Mexico). In recent years, government and accreditation agencies, and 
higher education organisations have developed their own systems for evaluating and ranking 
institutional performance: e.g. CHE (Germany)
, there is a fascination with the standing and trajectory of the top 100, less than 
1% of the world’s institutions. Like the ranking of restaurants or hotels, no one wants to be at 
the bottom of the hygiene list.  
2, AQA (Austria), CIEES, CACEI, CNEIP 
and CONEVET (Mexico), NAAC, NBA (India), Higher Education Council and TUBITAK 
(Turkey), the Commission on Higher Education and Philippine Accrediting Association of 
Schools, Colleges and Universities (Philippines), and the Higher Education Evaluation and 
Accreditation Council of Taiwan (HEEACT). In addition, there are a variety of commercial 
college ‘guide’ books and websites, e.g. the Good Universities Guide (Australia), 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (Germany) and Re$earch Infosource Inc. (Canada). As higher 
education has become globalized, the focus has shifted to worldwide university rankings, e.g. 
the Shanghai Jiao Tong Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), Times Higher 
Education QS Top Universities (THE QS), Webometrics, and so on. Today, there are over 50 
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national ranking systems and eight global rankings of varying significance, with three new 
ones anticipated for 2010/2011.  
The transformation of the higher education environment over the last few decades has 
been well documented (CERI, 2009; Marginson and van der Wende, 2007a; Altbach et al., 
2010).  Despite different perspectives, there is a general consensus about the speed and depth 
of the revolution impacting on higher education and the extent of change required or 
occurring in response. Without being too simplistic, there are probably four headline drivers.  
First, the positioning of knowledge as the foundation of economic, social and political 
power has driven the transformation of economies and the basis of wealth production from 
those based on productivity and efficiency to those based on higher valued goods and 
services innovated by talent. If the first phase of globalisation was marked by ‘working 
cheaper,’ the current phase is measured by connecting people and processes globally, and 
breaking down traditional barriers (Cheese et al., 2007 p. 2) – a contemporary version of 
Marx’s ‘heavy artillery...batter[ing] down all Chinese walls’ (1948, p. 125). Friedman’s 
(2007) flattening out of the globe, and Castell’s  (1996) ‘networked society’ are not just 
ignorant of national boundaries but are actively and daily destroying those boundaries and its 
industries while creating new working practices and forms of social networking. Today, 
almost 80 per cent of a company’s value comes from intangibles or soft knowledge – unique 
knowledge of services, markets, relationships, reputation, and brand (Hutton, 2006). 
Successful economies are those which rely on the ability to develop and exploit new 
knowledge for ‘competitive advantage and performance...through investment in knowledge-
based and intellectual assets – R&D, software, design new process innovation, and human 
and organisational capital’ (Brinkley, 2008, p. 17-18). Research shows that ‘productivity 
growth in the United States has been generated largely by advances in technology’ which in 
turn have been driven in recent years by innovation as measured by the number of patents 
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awarded to industry and universities (Chellaraj et al., 2005, p. 1). This has placed higher 
education – a provider of human capital through education and training, a primary source of 
new knowledge and knowledge/technology transfer, and a beacon for international 
investment and talent – at the centre of policymaking. Governments have endeavoured to 
‘steer’ and ‘restructure’ higher education in ways which, while supporting ‘autonomy’, use 
performance-based funding and, in many instances, institutional contracts to ensure higher 
education meets its social and economic objectives. The EU Lisbon Agenda aimed to make 
Europe ‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world’ by 
significantly increasing investment in R&D to 3 per cent of GDP and doubling the number of 
PhD students (Europa, 2000); it has been followed by Europe 2020 which focuses on ‘smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’ (Europa, 2010a). Most governments have similar models: 
Building Ireland’s Smart Economy (Government of Ireland, 2008), Brain Korea 21 (Korean 
Research Council, 1999), Malaysia’s Vision 2020 (Government of Malaysia, 1991), Abu 
Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 (Government of Abu Dhabi, 2008) and India’s National 
Knowledge Commission (Government of India, 2009), to name just a few. The global 
financial crisis of 2008 sounded alarm bells but it simply accelerated the speed of change 
bringing the BRIC countries (e.g. Brazil, Russia, India, and China) more firmly into the 
competitive spotlight. 
Second, at the moment when countries are dependent upon talent, many are under 
demographic pressure. This has arisen for a combination of reasons, including greying of the 
population and retirement of professionals combined with the end of the ‘baby boomer’ 
bubble and decline in the number of students. While the world population is likely to increase 
by 2.5 billion over the years to 2050, the population of the more developed regions is 
expected to remain largely unchanged, and would have declined, if not for net migration from 
developing to developed countries. In 2005, young people were 13.7 per cent of the 
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population in developed countries, but their share is expected to fall to 10.5 per cent by 2050 
(Bremner et al., 2009, pp.2, 6). This will affect the pool of secondary students, ultimately 
challenging government strategies for growing knowledge-intensive sectors of their 
economies. As a result, what the Daily Yomiuri calls the ‘scramble for students’ (Matsumoto 
and Ono, 2008 p. 1) and the Economist refers to as the ‘battle for brainpower’(Wooldridge, 
2006) is complementing more traditional struggles for natural resources. Knowing that people 
with higher levels of education are more likely to migrate (Europa, 2006a), governments 
around the world are introducing policies to attract ‘the most talented migrants who have the 
most to contribute economically’ (Rüdiger, 2008 p. 5; ICREA), especially in science and 
technology. The importance of mobility stems not just from its contribution to the production 
and dissemination of codified knowledge but also transmitting tacit knowledge in the 
broadest sense. There can be benefits for both sending and receiving countries (not just brain 
drain but brain circulation), if the latter has the appropriate absorptive capacities to attract 
(back) and retain high skilled talent (Hvistendahl, 2008). Internationalization, once seen 
simply as a policy of cultural exchange, is now a necessary mechanism to increase the 
number of international students, especially graduate research students (Hazelkorn, 2008c). 
The importance of the lucrative international student market has raised the global 
competitive stakes (Guruz, 2008; Green and Koch, 2010). In terms of actual numbers and 
percentage of total students, Western Europe and North America are the world regions of 
choice. Together, they host approximately 1.7 million of the 2.5 million international 
students, or 70 per cent of all international students (Guruz, 2008, p. 230). Under GATS, 
international or cross-border student mobility has become a recognizable, tradable 
commodity which is likely to encompass 7.2 million students annually by 2025 (Varghese, 
2008, p. 11). In Australia, education services were the third largest export earner in 2007-
2008, just behind coal and iron ore (AEPL, 2009), while ‘well-trained international graduate 
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students and skilled immigrants from such countries as India, China, Korea, and Singapore 
(the last two of which rank at the top in mathematics and science achievement)’ into the US 
plug the education gap caused by deficiencies elsewhere in the system (Chellaraj et al., 2005, 
p. 2). Other countries are copying these examples; Singapore, China, Malaysia, Japan, Jordan 
and Korea – to name just a few – want to significantly expand the number of international 
students within the next 5-10 years (Wildavsky, 2010, p. 24; Anon, 2010a). The Bologna 
initiative, initially focused on enhancing mobility within the EU, has prompted a worldwide 
re-tooling of educational systems to ease international mobility and enhance competition for 
the lucrative international student market (Cemmell and Bekhradnia, 2008). UK universities 
have been urged to ‘buckle up for a rough ride’ while Japanese universities are having to 
‘send ... recruiters out to high schools, hold ... open houses for prospective students, build ... 
swimming pools and revamp ... libraries, and recruit ... more foreign students’ (McNeill, 
2008). As a counter measure, governments are seeking better alignment between higher 
education, innovation and immigration policies to guarantee access to the global talent pool. 
Third, higher education has been transformed from being considered a social expenditure 
to being an essential component of the productive economy; accordingly, the way in which 
higher education is governed and managed has become a major policy issue. There is 
increasing emphasis on value-for-money, productivity and efficiency, and ensuring investor 
confidence, often referred to as ‘new public management’ (Deem, 2001) or what the EU calls 
the ‘modernisation’ agenda (Europa, 2006b, 2007a). The extent and breadth of the changes 
vary across national jurisdictions and sectors, but generally includes: restructuring academic 
programmes to make them more compatible, competitive and attractive; increased emphasis 
on research targets and outputs which are measurable and supported by competitively earned 
funding; links with industry and technology/knowledge transfer activities; and merging 
departments to promote efficiency, critical mass and visibility or abolishing those which no 
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longer attract sufficient students or meet quality standards. Changes in academic work and 
terms of employment chronicle the transformation from a relatively autonomous profession 
operating within a self-regulated code of ‘collegiality’ to an ‘organisationally managed’ 
workforce comparable to other salaried employees (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Rhoades, 
1998; Farnham, 1999; Altbach, 2000a and 2000b; Altbach and Lewis, 1996; Slaughter and 
Rhoades, 2004; Hazelkorn and Moynihan, 2010). At the system level, many governments are 
moving away from an egalitarian approach – where all institutions are broadly equal in status 
and quality – to one in which hierarchical or vertical differentiation is encouraged through 
competitive positioning and funding.  If higher education is the engine of the economy, then 
the productivity, quality and status of higher education institutions and university-based 
research becomes a vital indicator. The EU (Europa, 2006b) said 
 Universities should be funded more for what they do than for what they are, by 
focusing funding on relevant outputs rather than inputs,…Competitive funding 
should be based on institutional evaluation systems and on diversified 
performance indicators with clearly defined targets and indicators supported by 
international benchmarking. 
Or more succinctly, it ‘isn’t enough to just go around telling ourselves how good we are – we 
need to measure ourselves objectively against the world’s best’ (Carr, 2009). 
Finally, because education and graduate outcomes and lifestyle are strongly correlated 
with higher qualifications and career opportunities, students (and their parents) have become 
savvy consumers (Santiago et al., 2008). This is driven also by the rising costs of higher 
education – including tuition and relocation costs; students assess institutions and 
programmes as an opportunity-cost. Tuition fees reflect not just the actual costs of instruction 
but supply and demand factors. Widening access and higher education attainment may be 
important societal goals but the rewards are increasingly viewed as bringing private benefit.  
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In return, students require more consumer type information through guide books or 
comparative or benchmarking data, increasingly on a global scale and accessible online; 
student satisfaction surveys of teaching and academic endeavour, comparison of 
employability and potential salaries and reviews on the quality of the student experience and 
campus life are common place. And because there is a decline in the traditional student 
market and heightened competition for high-achieving students, the balance of consumer 
power is shifting. In the absence of institutionally generated comparative material, rankings 
have arguably and controversially become the accountability and transparency instrument by 
which students – especially international students –, governments and other stakeholders 
acquire such information. According to Webster (1992), HE administrators are partially ‘to 
blame’ for the rise in rankings; because higher education does not provide sufficient 
information about themselves, it encourages others to do so.  
These factors have combined to transform rankings from a consumer product into a 
global strategic instrument.  
[A] Theorising Rankings 
While rankings have occupied the attention of policy makers and HE leaders, they have 
also generated hundreds of academic articles, masters and PhD theses, and international 
conferences and seminars in addition to many more journalist articles and policy papers; 
there are even university courses dedicated to the topic (O’Meara, 2010). Over 1000 books, 
papers and articles have been sourced during the research and writing of this book; this must 
be a far cry from the minds of those who conceived and originated national or global 
rankings. ARWU was initiated to illustrate the position of Chinese universities vis-à-vis 
international leaders in order to support the ‘dream of generations of Chinese’ and lobby their 
government for appropriate support (Liu, 2009, p. 2), while USNWR aimed to provide 
‘prospective students and their parents with key evaluative information they need to make an 
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informed college choice that has important job and career implications’ (Morse, 2010a).  
Quacquarelli of QS, whose company launched the world university rankings with Times 
Higher Education (THE) in 2004, said its original purpose was to ‘serve students and their 
families’ although it is now used by ‘governments and university leaders ...to set strategic 
targets’ (Sharma, 2010a).  By capturing the Zeitgeist, these early market movers have created 
a lucrative industry.  
The literature on rankings can be roughly divided into two categories, methodological 
concerns and theoretical understanding. Most commentators have focused on the former, 
questioning and challenging the basis by which the indicators have been chosen, the 
weightings assigned to them, and the statistical method and accuracy or appropriateness of 
the calculations. This attention is not surprising given that rankings are a quantitative 
exercise, the methodology is still evolving and the results can be controversial. Given its 
infancy, rankers have welcomed and encouraged engagement with commentators and critics, 
and hosted conferences and workshops. It could be argued that this dialogue is necessitated 
by their brand image and underpinning philosophy; in other words, if rankings are about the 
transparency of higher education performance then it is incumbent upon the promoters to 
equally be transparent. On the other hand, the dialogue is arguably an essential part of the 
legitimising process; by engaging users in the process and clarifying their concerns the end 
product becomes more acceptable – and influential.  
A smaller group of commentators has sought to contextualize the growing obsession with 
rankings, to understand the basis of their popularity and to examine their impact and 
implications for and on higher education, and faculty and stakeholder behaviour. This 
literature has sought to explain the rankings phenomenon in terms of (i) nation states and 
supranational entities (e.g. the EU) locked into ‘strategies for national competitive 
advantage’; (ii) institutions ‘striving’ for survival in the process of which organisational and 
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institutional culture and behaviour is transformed in response to the external environment; or 
(iii) students and faculty using and responding to positive and negative correlations of self 
and peer perceptions of the ‘status system’. These issues can be broadly grouped into three 
sets of theoretical arguments, each of which seeks to situate changes in higher education 
within a broader frame: globalisation and networks of power, organisational behaviour and 
change, and social capital and positional goods.  
This section summarizes these positions, setting a context for the previous discussion and 
the remainder of the book. While each of the theoretical strands discussed below are read and 
used independently by different authors, this author’s argument is that these frameworks can 
be read in tandem. There is a strong linkage or overlap, with each theoretical approach 
describing or offering an explanation of different aspects of the rankings phenomenon. To 
preface the discussion below and throughout the book: rankings are an inevitable outcome 
and metaphor for the intensification of global competition, around which, higher education as 
both the progenitor of human capital and knowledge has become the fulcrum around which 
geo-political battles for a greater share of the global market are being fought. At the same 
time, HEIs are knowledge intensive industries behaving as other actors/firms in a competitive 
environment; to survive and thrive, many institutions are making changes to institutional 
strategy or adapting their behaviour to fit the ‘norm’ promulgated by rankings. Their 
behaviour is influenced by the perception that benefits – whether it is more and better able 
students, increased resources or enhanced prestige – flow to those who, according to 
rankings, are best. Students associate high rankings with better education quality and 
critically better career and lifestyle choices. Governments are doing likewise, restructuring or 
reshaping their systems in the view that high ranked institutions are beacons for investment 
and international talent – vital components for global competitiveness.  
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[B] Globalisation and Networks of Power 
Globalisation is the process of convergence and integration over national borders, 
creating a ‘single world market’ and ‘a common store of knowledge’. According to Castells 
(1996, p. 92), a global economy differs qualitatively from a world economy. In the latter, 
which has existed since the 16th century, ‘capital accumulation proceeds throughout the 
world’ while in the former, capital has the ‘capacity to work as a unit in real time on a 
planetary scale’.  By managing capital around the clock, capital and information flows are at 
once both global and autonomous from place and the actual performance of individual 
national economies. The ability to operate in an asymmetrical structure enhances the capacity 
of science, technology and knowledge as the determinant of social, economic and political 
power. Because innovation is the key to translating knowledge into new products and 
services, nations increasingly compete on the basis of their knowledge and innovation 
systems (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997).   
For Castells, knowledge is a commodity within globalized capital accumulation. In 
contrast with traditional (historic) factors, such as ‘land (natural resources), labour (human 
effort) and capital goods (machinery), knowledge is the “new factor of production”’ 
(Robertson, 2008, p. 4). Accordingly, academic research is no longer solely the pursuit of 
individual intellectual curiosity but is driven in large measure by national funding priorities 
which are tied to strategies of economic growth and competitiveness. Knowledge is important 
primarily in its ability to be converted into new products and services; in other words, 
‘knowledge is defined as intellectual property (IP) that has commercial value’ that ‘can be 
realized, in turn creating economic value and thus economic growth’ (Robertson, 2008, p. 5). 
Competitiveness is dependent upon the capacity of ‘national and supranational 
institutions to steer the growth strategy of those countries or areas under their jurisdiction 
including the creation of competitive advantage...’ (Castells, 1996, p. 105). While nation 
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states remain important, the architecture and geometry of the global economy rests upon the 
interdependence of economic regions ‘polarized along an axis of opposition between 
productive, information-rich, affluent areas and impoverished areas, economically devalued 
and socially excluded’ (Castells, 1996, p. 145). Clusters of high technology and highly 
specialized services and financial goods are congregated into what are known as 
‘technopoles’ (Castells, 1994a), ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2001) or ‘knowledge regions’ 
(Reichert, 2006); these form the ‘organizing nodes’ of a networked world (Friedman, 1995). 
According to Hall (2006), these nodes become centres where ‘professional talent of all kinds 
congregate...’  , ‘[S]tudents and teachers are drawn to the world cities: they commonly 
contain great universities, as well as a host of specialized institutions for teaching and 
research in the sciences, the technologies and the arts’. For city states, regions or nations to 
be attractive requires HEIs having, or growing, a reputation.   
These developments have major consequences for higher education, and have been 
responsible for transforming it into a key instrument of economic development; ‘new public 
management’ (NPM), twinned with neo-liberalism, has transformed HEIs into private market 
and performance-driven ‘competing universities-as-firms’  (Marginson, 2010a). This has 
involved the application of economic and business principles and management processes, 
with a strong emphasis on accountability, transparency and performance. Engagement in 
marketing, customer focus, entrepreneurship and industry-driven research has had 
implications for academic culture and work. Marginson (2010a) argues that this has created 
twin and somewhat oppositional actions: deregulation of the ‘university-as-firm’ to enable it 
to respond to the (labour) market, with all the vagaries that brings, and ‘over-regulation of 
academic output as performance’. Slaughter and Leslie (1997, pp. 36-37) contend that 
globalisation has had ‘four far-reaching implications for higher education’: i) the 
‘constriction of money for discretionary areas’, ii) growing centrality of techno-science and 
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fields’ which is closely involved with international markets, iii) tightening relationships 
between multinational corporations and state agencies, and iv) increased focus on intellectual 
property strategies. By redirecting education towards wealth creation and economic 
competitiveness, the distinction between knowledge and commodity collapses and 
‘knowledge becomes commodity’, with profound implications for institutions and faculty 
(Slaughter and Leslie, 1997, p. 38). The interconnection between knowledge, 
economic/industrial policy and intellectual property has helped reshape undergraduate and 
graduate education, and scholarly practice. Their argument is simple: nations compete on the 
basis of innovation which is ‘fundamentally stored in human brains’ (Castells, 1996, p. 95); it 
therefore necessitates investment in ‘academic capital.’  
Because higher education plays a fundamental role in creating competitive advantage in a 
market environment, performance matters. Marginson and van der Wende (2007a, p. 17) 
argue that governments and globally active HEIs pursue two related objectives: i) 
maximizing ‘capacity and performance within the global landscape’, and ii) optimizing the 
‘benefits of global flows, linkages and offshore operations back home in the national and 
local settings’. The higher education landscape is a ‘relational landscape’; this means that 
institutions and nations are constantly measured against each other according to indicators of 
global capacity and potential in which comparative and competitive advantages come into 
play. According to Robertson (1998, p. 224), in contrast to earlier periods when political 
struggle and human capital considerations combined to ‘compel an expansion of higher 
education’, the current period challenges that historical movement: ‘when the struggle for 
social equality...can no longer be resisted, ruling elites worldwide intensify reputational (and 
therefore social) differentiation between institutions’. 
While individual institutions and nations may pursue their own path, ‘they no longer have 
full command over their destinies’ (Marginson and van der Wende, 2007a, p. 13); they are 
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part of a wider geopolitical struggle in which ‘governments need to invigorate their national 
innovation systems in the context of a global knowledge economy’ (Robertson, 1998, p.227).  
This is especially true in the aftermath of the GFC. While the quest for world-class status 
preceded this ‘event’, the manner by which rankings have become a key driver of global 
reform of higher education stresses its significance for building strategies for competitive 
advantage – which depends upon higher education’s ability to act as a beacon for investment 
and international talent (Gulbrandsen, 1997).  Because research activity is the source of 
knowledge, intellectual property and innovation, global university rankings have become a 
critical relational indicator, strengthening ‘the element of competition and the status of the 
established institutions’, nations and world regions – and conferring power (Marginson and 
van der Wende, 2007a, p.34). The quotes at the beginning of this chapter and the media 
headlines below (see Box 1) illustrate the way in which higher education has become 
(interpreted as) a global battle ground.   
[B] Organisational Behaviour and Change 
The normalization of the discourse of competitive rankings has contributed to their rapid 
proliferation and dominance; the discussion which follows draws, inter alia, on Foucault and 
Gramsci. The former provides a useful theoretical frame by which to understand how 
institutions and governments feel compelled to respond – and make changes – to higher 
education in line with the model proffered by rankings in order to thrive, while the latter 
speaks to the way in which rankings have come to dominate higher education discourse.  
Writing on discipline, surveillance and punishment, Foucault (1977, p. 209) argued that 
control has shifted from punishment to more abstract forms of ‘disciplinary technology’ 
which normalize behaviour by regulating the space, time or activity of people’s lives. The 
‘schema of exceptional discipline’ is transformed into ‘what might be called in general the 
disciplinary society’, whereby power is exercised, not in a direct manner, but through a series 
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of complex relations and relationships ‘enacted through subtle practices and banal 
procedures’. 
...neither the territory (unit of domination), nor the place (unit of residence), 
but the rank: the place one occupies in a classification...Discipline is an art of 
rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements... (Quoted in Sauder 
and Espeland, 2009, p. 69) 
Thus, ‘one of the great instruments of power’ is that of normalization – by which 
homogeneity is achieved and differences in behaviour are exposed. Barker and Cheney 
(1994, p. 20) explain that while  
The whip and the watch govern our behaviour...the governance of the watch is 
the more unobtrusive and more thoroughgoing of the two types of ‘authority’ 
because our regular submission to it is a willing, almost wholly voluntary act.  
Foucault postulates that power and control are exercised through continual and anonymous 
surveillance, whereby the regulators and the regulated are juxtaposed and interdependent in a 
way which is embedded in everyday practice. The effect parallels commonly used sayings 
such as ‘that’s the way things are done around here’ or ‘conventional wisdom’ (Barker and 
Cheney, 1994, p. 24). 
Drawing on Foucault, Sauder and Espeland (2009) show how rankings not only change 
perceptions of education through both coercive and seductive means, but how constant 
surveillance of performance, through the use of rankings, can result in an obsessive form of 
control which is internalized. They argue that higher education as well as individual HE 
actors has come under pressure to conform – responding to different stakeholders and the 
complex environment, demonstrating accountability and transparency in increasingly 
quantitative measures. Reactions to rankings are ‘best understood as the evolving responses 
of an assortment of actors who struggle to reconcile their sense of themselves as professional 
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educators with an imposed market-based logic of accountability’(Sauder and Espeland, 2009 
p. 66) . While higher education may seek to ‘de-couple’ itself from the pressure of rankings – 
and the way in which they influence external perceptions of the university – it is difficult to 
successfully achieve this. Drawing on their research of law schools, Sauder and Lancaster 
(2006, p. 130) say  
many administrators note that internal constituencies such as current students, 
faculty, and even members of the administration itself are affected by changes 
in rank; among the manifestations of these effects are morale changes, 
transfers, changes in the ability to attract new faculty, and an increase or 
decrease in job security for administrators. 
Rankings may provoke anger and resentment, by exhibiting a constant ‘surveillance’ or 
presence in/over the higher education environment, but they have become a ‘self-
disciplining’ force.  
In comparing institutions with each other, ‘one person’s or one institution’s performance 
[is pitted] against all others’ thereby imposing a process of normalization (Sauder and 
Espeland, 2009, p. 73). Rankings create hierarchies by establishing a ‘single norm for 
excellence’, which are turned into mechanisms or tools of differentiation. This is done 
through the use of measurement and quantification ‘to judge and control these relations’ in 
the same way Foucault’s ‘discipline’ ‘constructs compliant, self-policing subjects’ and 
‘defines normal, marks deviance, and creates the experts who maintain the boundaries’  
(Espeland and Sauder, 2007, pp. 4-5). These norms play a central role in influencing, 
incentivizing and changing behaviour and attitudes ‘above and beyond one’s own perceptions 
of quality’ (Bowman and Bastedo, 2009, p. 4), including encouraging some schools to adopt 
missions that conform to assumptions embedded in rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007). 
Drawing on the concepts of ‘reactivity’ and ‘reflectivity’, Espeland and Sauder argue that 
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rankings effect a gradual transformation of HEIs ‘into entities that conform more closely to 
the criteria used to construct rankings, and...prompt[ing] the redistribution of resources, the 
redefinition of work, and gaming’ (2007, p. 33). Essentially, over time, higher education 
actors are brought into line, behaving rationally and responding appropriately to the 
‘contaminating influence of measurements on their target object’ (Espeland and Sauder, 
2007, p. 6).  
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony also helps to explain how rankings have come to 
dominate the discussion of higher education quality and performance. Like Foucault, 
Gramsci (1971, p. 419) believed power is not exercised directly but opaquely through cultural 
norms (views, practices, institutions, etc.) which become pervasive and thus are seen to be 
normalised, as ‘lived experience’  or ‘common sense’ which is ‘uncritically absorbed by the 
various social and cultural environments...’ Hall et al (1978) concept of ‘moral panic’ is 
drawn from Gramsci. In his writings, he discussed how crime statistics are often manipulated 
by the political world and media to sensitize the public to a particular viewpoint; in this way, 
they help ‘set the agenda’ of public discourse. 
Statistics – whether crime rates or opinion polls – have an ideological function: 
they appear to ground free floating and controversial impressions in the hard, 
incontrovertible soil of numbers. Both the media and the public have enormous 
respect for ‘the facts’ – hard facts (Hall et al, 1978, p.9). 
Rankings play a similar hegemonic function. They create a powerful set of ideas or values 
around which a particular model of higher education or concept of quality or excellence 
becomes the accepted norm.  
Rational choice theory adds a further dimension; it argues that individuals choose actions 
that are most ‘likely to give them the greatest satisfaction’ (Scott, 2000, p. 128) or make 
choices on the basis of ‘return on investment’. Becker argues that ‘people rationally evaluate 
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the benefits and costs of activities...whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or 
masochistic’. While their ‘behaviour is forward-looking’, it ‘may still be rooted in the past, 
for the past can exert a long shadow on attitudes and values’ (Becker, 1993, p. 402).  Levitt 
and Dubner (2009, p. 12) also use economics to understand behaviour arguing that 
‘incentives are the cornerstone of modern life’. Whether higher education leaders seek to 
mitigate the impact on their institution, redefine goals or seek to improve performance, it 
could be argued that they are responding rationally to the circumstances in which they find 
themselves. The fact that they are doing so illustrates how successfully rankings have 
embedded themselves within the environment and incentivize behaviour.  
Finally, Bastedo and Bowman (2011) use open system theory to ‘contribute to our 
understanding of rankings as an interorganisational dependency’ to show ‘how organisations 
adapt and manage the norms, values and beliefs in their environment, in order to increase the 
chances of organisational survival.’ This includes developing tactics to influence rankings (for 
example by manipulating the data supplied), boycotting the questionnaires sent by rankings 
for peer review, or responding strategically. The latter illustrates that contrary to views that 
HEIs are hapless in a highly deterministic environment, they are pro-actively engaged in a 
range of strategic responses, ‘including reactivity, decoupling, and impression management’ 
in a manner which reveals an ‘interorganisational dependency on resource flows related to the 
U.S. News & World Report college rankings.’ Ultimately there is a resource dependency 
relationship; resource and financial benefits can result from ‘the evaluations of certain 
legitimate third parties through their influence with external resource providers’ (Bastedo and 
Bowman, 2009, p. 26). Because the stakes are so high, rankings provoke retaliatory or 
protective responses. Elsbach and Kramer (1996, p. 470) show that 
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when organisational members perceive that their organisation’s identity is 
threatened, they try to protect both personal and external perceptions of their 
organisation as well as their perceptions of themselves as individuals.  
This may involve focusing ‘members’ attention on what they should be doing and 
why’, explaining ‘what their organisation is about’ in order to re-categorize it, 
directing and focusing attention on other (more positive) aspects of performance, or 
ultimately ‘chang[ing] or reshap[ing] their identities’ (Elsbach and Kramer, 1996, p. 
472). 
[B] Social Capital and Positional Goods  
The work of Bourdieu, Hirsch and Frank et al. shows that rankings have heightened 
competition between institutions and nations, by focusing on reputational value and limited 
access to what are called positional goods. In doing so, rankings elevate and fetishize 
particular conceptualisations of status, creating a social norm against which all institutions 
are measured that quietly insinuates itself into public discourse.  
Bourdieu (1986) differentiates between three kinds of capital: economic capital, which 
can be converted into money and institutionalized in the form of property; cultural capital, 
which in certain circumstances may be converted into money or institutionalized in, inter alia, 
educational qualifications; and social capital.  Social capital is a function of power relations 
whereby individuals seek to advance their interests and social position, and the division of 
economic, cultural and social resources in general are legitimized. It is the ‘aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or 
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’. Social capital 
provides ‘its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a “credential” 
which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.’ For example, membership of 
a family, class, tribe or school may confer social capital or status on an individual or group. 
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Profits or benefits can accrue by membership of such groups by the reproduction of social 
capital; this assumes that there is a ‘continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is 
endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed’.  
Taking a corresponding view, Hirsch (1997, p. 6) developed the concept of ‘positional 
goods’ whereby people’s access to ‘socially scarce goods and facilities...is determined in 
accord not with absolute but relative real income.’ The key factor is the ‘individual’s position 
in the distribution of purchasing power’. However, competition for such goods is scarce; this 
means that only a few people can benefit at any one time. It becomes a zero sum game – as 
some people gain, others must lose out. Veblen had earlier emphasized that ‘it is the relative 
value of any good, quality, or achievement from which status value is derived’ (Quoted in 
Sauder, 2006, p. 302). Frank (2001) similarly argued that because of their limited nature, 
‘positional goods’ create an ‘arms race’ or a scenario in which the ‘winner takes all’. To the 
‘buying public’ there may be an imperceptible difference between success and failure, but to 
the ‘manufacturers the stakes are often enormous’. In the process, these ‘high stakes have 
created a new class of “unknown celebrities”; those pivotal players who spell the differences 
between corporate success and failure’ (Frank and Cook, 2003, p. 55; Bastedo and Bowman, 
2009, p. 28). The widening gap between winners and losers has intensified competition for 
top prizes and positions, and in the process has conferred gate-keeper status on elite 
educational institutions because they are perceived as having the capability to boost one’s 
status relative to others. Another way of describing the circle of benefit which corresponds to 
a winner-take-all market is the concept of the ‘Matthew Effect’ whereby the ‘elite receive 
disproportionate credit and resources, as they are caught in a virtuous cycle of cumulative 
advantage’ (Gumport, 2000, pp.4-5). This is based on a line in St. Matthew’s Gospel 
(Matthew 25:29) that says, ‘For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have 
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abundance:  but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath’ (Biblos). 
In other words, ‘The rich get richer, and the poor get poorer’ – or the ‘winner takes all’. 
How do these concepts relate to rankings? Brewer et al. (2001) write that reputation and 
prestige are assets which allow HEIs to convey ‘non price information to customers’; 
‘reputation is built over time and can be tested, while prestige is intangible and may be based 
on opinion or perception’. Although the boundary between elite and non-elite universities 
may have been known only amongst a few people heretofore, this is no longer the case 
especially in the context of the massification of higher education and the demands of the 
knowledge economy which privileges such credentials. For Bastedo and Bowman (2011, p. 
10), ‘rankings constitute a third-party status system that forms a significant part of the 
normative environment of universities.  Chang and Osborn (2005, p341) use Debord’s theory 
of ‘spectacle’ to argue that rankings create powerful images, which like advertising  
offer a simple ‘picture’ through which consumers, parents and students can 
‘see’ an institution. More specifically, students see an institution’s place (i.e. its 
‘value’) in the hierarchical order of a USN-created spectacular economy. 
They encourage a ‘positional arms race’ with elite degrees conferring advantage which is 
heightened by their limited number and restricted access (Winston, 2000).  In different ways, 
accreditation and rankings create status systems by emphasizing vertical or hierarchical 
stratification; Figure 1.1 was designed to illustrate the effect of accreditation systems, but it is 
equally appropriate to rankings.  
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Figure 1.1 Status Systems as Portrayed by Accreditation and Rankings 
 
Source:  With kind permission from Springer Science+Business Media: Theory and Society, 
Third Parties and Status Position: How the Characteristics of Status Systems Matter’, vol. 35, 
no. 3, 2006, pp 307-308, M. Sauder, Figure 1 and 2.  
 
Since status confers benefits, HEIs are active participants in the construction of status 
systems (Becher and Trowler, 2001). O’Meara (2007, pp. 123-124) describes institutional 
behaviour or reaction as ‘striving’, building upon earlier concepts of  
‘vertical extension’ (Schultz & Stickler, 1965), ‘academic drift’ (Berdahl, 
1985) and ‘upper drift’ (Aldersley, 1995), ‘academic ratcheting’ (Massey & 
Zemsky, 1994), and institutional isomorphism towards research culture 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Milem, Berger & Dey, 2000; Morphew, 2002; 
Riesman, 1956). Additionally, this concept has been called, ‘institutional 
homogenization’ or ‘institutional imitation’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jencks 
& Reisman, 1968; Scott, 1995) (sic). 
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Universities which seek to improve their position in rankings – thereby enhancing their status 
– are seen to be ‘striving’. A more pejorative way of describing higher education behaviour 
uses the ‘game’ metaphor, thereby suggesting that engagement with rankings conforms to 
accepted rules or norms (Corley and Gioia, 2000, p. 320; Wedlin, 2006). Volkwein and 
Sweitzer (2006) argue that mission, size and wealth influence how an institution deploys its 
resources and affects (positively) its ‘institutional attractiveness’. Similarly, Winston (2000, 
p. 16) argues that the ‘positional arms race’ propels all HEIs to spend more money to attract 
high achieving students; ‘pressure from a school below, through increased spending or 
reduced price, is more effective in inducing an arms race response than is a growing gap with 
a school above’.   
Rankings are a symptom (Ehrenberg, 2001, p. 16) but also an accelerator of the 
‘reputation race’. While higher education has always been competitive, ‘rankings make 
perceptions of prestige and quality explicit’ (Quoted in Freid, 2005, p. 17). Because of the 
increased number of institutions and students, and the link between attendance at prestigious 
universities and career and salary benefits, a ‘higher education arms war’ has emerged. 
Brewer et al. (2001) and Freid (2005, p. 89) argue that ‘reputation and prestige conferred on 
elite colleges today is based in part on their selectivity – of the best students and of the best 
faculty’. Van Vught (2008, p. 168) argues that academic norms play a significant role in 
shaping institutional and faculty responses to pressures from the external environment; this is 
especially the case in a market in which ‘universities and other higher education institutions 
appear to be particularly driven by the wish to maximize their (academic) prestige and to 
uphold their reputations’. Because rankings advantage traditional academic outputs, they 
increase the ‘reputation race’ by encouraging ‘mimicking behaviour (imitating the high-
rankings institutions)...’ (van Vught, 2008, p. 172). In turn, by restricting access to what 
society views as critical ‘positional goods’, rankings help maintain the ‘status system’ (Bok, 
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2003, p. 159). Ultimately, only one university can be number 1; as one moves up, another 
must move down. Similarly, each HEI has a limited number of student places which enhances 
the value of each place and intensifies competition.   
[A] Summary  
The arrival of the ARWU and the THE QS were remarkably well-timed and auspicious, 
albeit arguably, global rankings were a product whose time had come. They complement the 
worldwide shift in public policy and impact on three sets of higher education-government 
relationships: improving performance and productivity, greater institutional governance and 
fiscal accountability, and market-led quality assurance and accreditation (van Vught et al., 
2002). Global rankings have raised the competitive bar and heaped pressure on institutions 
and systems – becoming the driver and rationale for significant restructuring and the means 
by which success and failure are gauged (Ritzen, 2010; Aghion et al., 2007; Lambert and 
Butler, 2006; Boulton and Lucas, 2008). By highlighting reputational advantage, rankings 
have affected all higher education institutions – even those which had previously been 
sheltered by history, mission or governance. HEIs are transformed into strategic knowledge-
intensive corporations, engaged in positional competition, balanced fragilely between their 
current and their preferred rank. High-ranked and not-ranked, international-facing and 
regionally-focused, all institutions have been drawn into the global knowledge market. By 
granting visibility to some institutions, rankings have become an important tool for strategic 
positioning and global branding.   
The danger of not responding adequately to the challenge of 
internationalization is tremendous as the best academic institutions are 




As a consequence, HEIs are incentivized by the benefits which are perceived to derive from 
being highly ranked. They are becoming more strategic, reorganizing structures and 
procedures, allocating resources to fields of study and research which are internationally 
competitive and re-engineering student recruitment.  
In a rational world, because of the neglect of funding and the crisis a lot of 
people talk about, the problems universities have, in terms of finding support 
from public sources, getting the best students possible, increasing  research 
capacity with private investment, all that kind of thing... So the rankings are a 
very pragmatic thing that a Vice Chancellor has to do because they do flow 
onto the calibre of students they get, the sources of private investment they get, 
the reputation and calibre of the university and that is important when the 
financial situation is difficult (Student leader, Australia). 
Global rankings are the realization that in a global knowledge economy, national pre-
eminence is no longer enough.   
But rankings have wider sway. As a product of globalisation, they appear to order global 
knowledge, and provide a ‘plausible’ framework or lens through which the global economy 
and national (and supranational) positioning can be understood (Marginson and van der 
Wende, 2007a, p.55). Despite continuing dispute about the validity of the choice of indicators 
and/or their weightings, rankings have acquired legitimacy because the methodology appears 
statistically rigorous and the various producers willingly engage with critics and occasionally 
make modifications. Table 1.1 provides a perspective of global competitiveness through the 
eyes of media headlines, which in turn, sets the agenda and influences public opinion (Box 
1.1).  
Box 1.1 Media Headlines 
‘International Losses Could Jeopardise Australian Rankings’, Campus Review, 
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2009 (Ross, 2009) 
 ‘America Retreats as Asia Advances’ The Trumpet 2010 (Jacques, 2010) 
‘The Fall of American Universities’, The Korea Times, 2010 (Costello, 2010a) 
‘Crouching Tigers Ready to Pounce’, Times Higher Education, 2010 (Baty, 
2010a) 
‘Universities to Rival West's in 25 years’, Global Times, 2010 (Dong, 2010) 
‘Irish Universities Lagging Behind in Global Rankings’, The Independent, 2009 
(Donnelly, 2009) 
‘Odugbemi - How Varsities Can Make Top Global Ranking’, All Africa, 2010 
(Edukugo, 2010b)  
‘Looming Challenges - Universities must look abroad to reverse Japan's brain 
drain’, The Japan Times, 2010 (Fukue, 2010) 
‘RP [Philippine] Schools Lag in R&D in Asia’, Malaya Business Insight, 2010 
(Icamina, 2010) 
‘UK holds its own against US giants’, Times Higher Education Supplement, 
2006 (Ince, 2006) 
‘Is Kenya Ready for World-Class Universities?’ The Standard, 2009 (Kigotho, 
2009) 
‘Oxbridge 'Could be Matched' by Chinese Universities’, The Daily Telegraph, 
2010 (Paton, 2010) 
‘A Technological Powerhouse to Rival MIT and Oxbridge; The French are 
Waking the Sleeping Giant’, The Independent, 2010 (Prest, 2010) 
 
Because rankings use quantification as the basis for determining quality and 
performance, they privilege older, well-resourced universities, which are highly selective in 
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their recruitment of students and faculty and whose comparative advantages have 
accumulated over time. Sheil (2009) estimates that there is a superleague of about twenty-five 
world-leading universities, the majority of which are private US institutions with extensive 
endowments. Notwithstanding a steep decline of 11.9 per cent in private earnings due to the 
impact of the GFC, the top ten earning US universities still managed to raise USD 4.4 billion 
between them in 2009 (Masterson, 2010; CAE 2009). If, however the THE QS rankings are 
recalibrated according to GDP or population size, Beerkens (2008) shows the US slips to 14th 
position and smaller states like Switzerland, Hong Kong, Denmark, New Zealand and Israel 
rise to the top (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Hence, depending upon what is measured and how, the 
world order changes. 
Table 1.1 Indicator of Global Competitiveness? 
Top 100 Universities THE-QS  ARWU QS THE-TR 
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2010 2010 2010 
US 37 37 32  53 54 55  54 31 54 
Europe 35 36 38  34 34 32  33 42 28 
Australia/New 
Zealand 
9 8 9  2 3 3  3 8 5 
Asia Pacific (incl. 
Israel) 
13 14 16  7 5 6  6 15 10 
Latin America/Africa 0 0 0  0 0 0  0 0 0 
Canada 6 5 4  4 4 4  4 4 3 
China (incl. HK)  5  5 5  0  0 0  0 6 5 
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France 2 2 2  4 3 3  3 2 3 
Germany 3 3 4  6 6 5  5 5 3 
Ireland 1 1 2  0 0 0  0 1 2 
Japan  4  4 6  5  4 5  5 5 2 
Russia 0 0 0  1 1 1  1 1 0 
Singapore 2  2  2  0  0  0  0 2 1 
Switzerland 1 3 4  3 3 3  3 3 4 
Sweden 1 2 2  4 4 3  3 2 2 
UK 19 17 18  11 11 11  11 19 14 
 
Note: Global regions are indicated above the heavy line, and indicative countries below.  
Source: ARWU, THE-QS, QS, and THE-TR websites. 
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Table 1.2 Rankings Correlated with Population Size 
 
Source: Permission to publish by the author, E. Beerkens, 2008. 
Table 1.3 Rankings Correlated with GDP 
 
Source: Permission to publish by the author, E. Beerkens, 2008. 
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Even though the financial outlay is so high, pursuit of ‘world-class’ status has become a 
mantra for many governments and institutions paralleling the obsession with rankings; 
arguably the two have become interchangeable. As Altbach (2003) says, ‘Everyone wants a 
world-class university. No country feels it can do without one.’ To lose position can be 
humiliating for nations and institutions alike (EdMal, 2005; Alexander and Noonan, 2007). 
Fetishization of world-class status is the rationale or justification for the pursuit of elite 
universities and reconsideration of the desire for the massification of higher education, which 
was the cornerstone of policy throughout the late 20th century (Altbach, 2008, p. 9). As 
Mohrman et al. argue (2008), the research university has become the basis for an emerging 
global model (EGM), which has insinuated itself into public and political discourse (see 
chapter 6). Individuals and public/private agencies, unaware of the nuances of the 
nomenclature, have unwittingly become its transmitter, using the language of ‘world-class 
universities’ to publicize their region’s attributes or lobby for a particular strategy.  
While widening participation remains a policy priority for every country, the emphasis 
has shifted from getting more students into school to quality and excellence, to ‘selective 
investment and greater concentration of research’ and to ‘greater stratification between 
universities’ (Marginson, 2007c). The argument is sometimes put forth as too many 
universities or too many students in the context of the (rising) cost of maintaining quality, 
sometimes portrayed as a tension or conflict between equality and excellence (Flynn, 2010; 
Martin, 2008; Steinberg, 2009; Berger 2009). Societal goals are seen to be oppositional rather 
than complementary. This line of reasoning is often ambiguously stated; for example, both 
OECD and the World Bank temper their promotion of top universities ‘operating at the 
cutting edge of intellectual and scientific development’ with questions about whether the 
world-class model is ‘synonymous with ‘elite Western’ models and if there can be  
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other types of tertiary education institutions (such as teaching universities, 
polytechnics, community colleges, and open universities) [which can] also 
aspire to be among the best of their kind in an international perspective’ 
(Salmi, 2009, p3; Vincent-Lancrin and Kärkkäinen, 2009). 
Similarly Birnbaum (2007) has argued 
Rather than more World-class Universities, what we really need in countries 
everywhere are more world-class technical institutes, world-class community 
colleges, world-class colleges of agriculture, world-class teachers colleges, and 
world-class regional state universities. The United States doesn’t have a world-
class higher education system because it has many world-class universities; 
instead it has world-class universities because it has a world-class higher 
education system. 
But, their warning is lost in the hyperbole.  
The policy panic which has accompanied the current global economic and financial 
collapse has escalated this trend, exposed national insecurities and propelled countries 
heretofore agnostic to grab hold of rankings as a justification for sudden policy adjustments 
and system restructuring. International research prestige is pitted against mass education 
demands (Mohrman et al., 2008, p. 19). The EGM favours institutions with  
English speaking faculty and students, science disciplines, research topics that 
attract funding from businesses and society, publications in international 
journals, and graduate programs in which human capital development and 
knowledge production are complimentary rather than competitive (Mohrman et 
al., 2008 p. 25). 
As will be evidenced latter in this book, these are some of the outcomes many HEIs and 
governments are actively seeking to achieve in the belief that being highly ranked is not just 
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equivalent to being better quality but to being globally competitive. The effect is apparent at 
all levels. Students – especially international students – are both an object of desire and a 
diligent user of rankings, as are other stakeholders who range far beyond the initial target 
audience. Faculty are both victims and cheer-leaders, depending upon their own position 
within the international academic labour market and the ‘status system’, as institutional 
resources are shifted to areas that shape prestige. At the national level, rankings have become 
a (convenient and timely) policy instrument and management tool. Ultimately, governments 
and institutions use rankings to guide restructuring of higher education because societies 
which are attractive to investment in research and innovation and highly skilled mobile talent 
will be more successful globally. Finally, rankings amplify the growing gap between elite and 
mass education, heightening the value of key ‘positional goods’ essential for global 
competitiveness, and intensifying the attractiveness of ‘winners’ with consequential 














                     
1 The IAU World Higher Education Database (WHED) provides information on 15,400 
university-level institutions (institutions offering at least a post-graduate degree or a 





Africa 51 1006 
Asia 31 4479 
Caribbean 11 114 
Europe 49 3736 
Latin America 20 1947 
Middle East 14 348 
North America 3 3685 
Oceania 9 85 
 
 
2 CHE – Centre for Higher Education (Germany); AQA – Agency for Quality Assurance 
(Austria); CIEES – Comités Interinstitucionales para la Evaluación de la Educación 
Superior, A.C (Mexico) The Inter-Institutional Committee for the Evaluation of Higher 
Education; CACEI – Consejo de Acreditación de la Enseñanza de la Ingeniería, A.C 
(Mexico) Counsel of the Accreditation of the Teaching of Engineering; CENEVAL - Centro 
Nacional de Evaluación para la Educación Superior— CENEVAL (Mexico);CNEIP - 
Consejo Nacional de Enseñanza e Investigación en Psicología (Mexico) National counsel of 
Teaching and Investigation in Psychology; NAAC – National Assessment and Accreditation 
Council (India); NBA – National Board of Accreditation (India);TUBITAK - The Scientific 
and Technological Research Council of Turkey.  
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